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NO INNOCENTS HERE: USING LITIGATION TO FIGHT AGAINST THE
COSTS OF UNIVERSAL SERVICE IN FRANCE
Dorit Rub instein Reiss'
INTRODUCTION
A major difference between United States and European practice and outlook is found in
the relationship of regulation to competition. In the United States, opening a utility market to
competition is described as "deregulation." In Europe, however, opening market to competition
is seen as requiring careful regulation after monopoly rights and duties are cancelled, to prevent
abuses from powerful corporate actors and protect valuable interests.] When I carelessly referred
to the liberalization of the telecommunications market as "deregulation," a Swedish interviewee
corrected me: "No. Before, we had an unregulated monopoly. Now, we have regulated
competition." 2 One reason for this difference in perspective can be attributed to a difference in
starting points. The United States had traditionally provided utilities by means of licensed
monopolies, which while heavily regulated were still privately held companies, while most
countries in Europe provided utilities through nationalized industries administered directly by the
state in some way. Thus, the U.S. already had a vast array of regulation in play, some of which
was eliminated in order to permit competition. Another factor is that several countries in Europe
distrust the market to deliver certain kinds of goods and thus see a need for careful regulation.
Those involved in regulating the newly competitive sectors correctly recognize that the greatest
danger to successful liberalization is the previous state monopoly (the "incumbent"), both
because of its size and power and because it has every incentive not to cooperate with the
liberalization in normal circumstances.3 Although in specific cases operators may have interests
* Associate Professor, UC Hastings College of the Law. I am grateful to Bruce Carruthers, David Coolidge, Aaron
Rappaport, and Frangois Varloot for very useful comments to previous versions of this project and to Frederic
Carteron and Shelley Kennedy for invaluable research assistance and input.
Vincent Wright, Public Administration, Regulation, Deregulation and Reregulation, in MANAGING PUBLIC
ORGANIZATIONS: LESSONS FROM CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE 244, 252-253 (Kjell A. Eliassen and Jan
Kooiman eds., 1993) (describing the European context and showing that the result of reforms to liberalize sectors
was reregulation, not just deregulation); STEVEN K. VOGEL, FREER MARKETS, MORE RULES 16-18 (1996)
(demonstrating that privatization led to deregulation, focusing on cases from Britain and Japan); Giandomenico
Majone, Cross-National Sources of Regulatory Policymaking in Europe and the United States, 11 J. OF PUB. POL'Y
79, 85 (1991). This description is somewhat simplistic; careful observers of regulation across both Europe and the
United States emphasize the connection between state withdrawal from delivery and public services and a growth in
regulation. See, CREATING COMPETITIVE MARKETS: THE POLITICS OF REGULATORY REFORM (Marc K. Landy et al.
eds. 2007). Nonetheless, I believe it captures differences in the basic approaches.
2 Interview with a member of the Swedish Post and Telecom Agency, in Stockholm, Sweden (Sept. 7, 2004). Some
of the information included in this article has not appeared in publication before and is based on original empirical
research conducted through open ended interviews with actors in Sweden, France and England in 2004. The
interviews were conducted under guarantees of anonymity, as required to get the approval of the Institutional
Review Board at UC Berkeley working under federal regulations to protect human subjects. For that reason, the
names of the interviewees, and on occasion (when it's too revealing) the specific location of the interview, will not
be reported, though the date of the interview and the institutional affiliation of the interviewees will be reported.
3 PETER CAMERON, COMPETITION IN ENERGY MARKETS: LAW AND REGULATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 8, 18, 55-
56 (2002); Damien Geradin, The Opening of State Monopolies to Competition: Main Issues of the Liberalization
Process, in THE LIBERALIZATION OF STATE MONOPOLIES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND BEYOND, 181, 181-183
(Damien Geradin ed., 1999); Helena Lindskog, The Telecommunications Market In Sweden From Monopoly To
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that would lead them to support the move to liberalization, 4 they are less likely to support the
new obligations placed on them following liberalization: they will naturally want to maximize
the advantages accruing to them from liberalizing while minimizing the restrictions placed on
their use of their market power. To balance this power advantage of the previous incumbents,
European Union institutions regulating utilities sectors tend to focus on enforcing competition.5
This approach comfortably fits the emphasis in the EU treaties on ensuring free movement of
goods and services and preventing protectionism of large national firms against competition.6
However, the incumbent operator is not the only powerful economic actor in European
member states. Some of the new entrants are also powerful corporations. The natural image of
the new entrant in communications for many laypeople is the small communications start up,
which can be described in contrast to huge, impersonal multi national corporations or huge
incumbents that initially dominate the market. But many of the operators entering the European
communications market are "new entrants" to a specific country, but as described in part 1.b, in
no other way resemble a small start up.8 These sophisticated, powerful economic actors naturally
want to maximize the benefits from liberalization. One avenue for them is to use the European
Institutions to promote the aspects of liberalization they prefer - for example, access to the
incumbent network - and at the same time use them to avoid the counterweights put in place to
prevent harm from liberalization and avoid obligations put in place to protect valuable interests.
That is not to say that these actors do not need protection against the incumbent, with its inherent
advantages, just to caution that they should not be automatically seen as the "under dog," a
David needing help against a Goliath. That is not a criticism of these new entrants; part of the
philosophy behind liberalization is that the entry of new competitors would bring the benefits of
free market competition to the sector. Sophisticated competitors, out to maximize their benefits,
Competition, Paper presnted at the 2004 Applied Business Research Conference, San Juan, Puerto Rico, 9 (2004),
available at: http://www.heldag.com/articles/Telecom%/o20market%/o20ABR%/o202004%/o20%/o20H%/ 20Lindskog.pdf.
(Last visited April 16, 2010).
4 For example, Thatcher convincingly argued that telecommunications operators in Europe supported liberalization
and achieving freedom from the government as a way to reduce political control over them and political intervention
in their actions and to get better access to capital. See Mark Thatcher, The National Politics of European Regulation:
Institutional Reform in Telecommunications, in UTILITIES REFORM IN EUROPE 11, 13 (David Coen & Mark Thatcher
eds., 2001); Mark Thatcher, Winners and Losers in Europeanisation: Reforming the National Regulation of
Telecommunications, 27 W. EUR. POL. 284 (2004) [hereinafter Thatcher 2004]. For electricity, several authors
showed that EDF, France's incumbent electricity operator supported, even though reluctantly, some liberalization
since it would allow it to expand to other markets and it believed it is in a good position to withstand competition.
Ian Bartle, When Institutions No Longer Matter: Reform of Telecommunications and Electricity in Germany, France
and Britain, 22 J. PUB. POL'Y 1, 16 (2002); Rainer Eising, Policy Learning in Embedded Negotiations: Explaining
EU Electricity Liberalization, 56 INT'L ORGS. 85, 97-99; Rainer Eising & Nicolas Jabko, Moving Targets: National
Interests and Electricity Liberalization in the European Union, 34 COMP. POL. STUD. 742, 745-47 (2001). This
willingness to support initial liberalization, however, does not undermine the point made here: the operators may
have an interest in some liberalization, but they also have an interest in preserving their own market power as much
as possible within the liberalized market.
Vivien A. Schmidt, Europeanization and the Mechanics of Economic Policy Adjustment, 9 J. EUR. PUB. POL'Y 894,
908 (2002); Thatcher 2004, supra note 4.
6 Joachim Scherer, Electronic Communication Lm and Policy of the European Union, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS
LAW IN EUROPE: LAW AND REGULATION OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS (Joachim Scherer ed., 5th ed. 2005);
Christian Joerges, Good Governance Through Comitology?, in EU COMMITTEES: SOCIAL REGULATION, LAW AND
POLITICS 311, 316 (Christian Joerges & Ellen Vos eds., 1999); Schmidt, supra note 5 at 906.
Some examples of smaller telecommunications companies include Primus Telecommunications,
www.pirumustel.co.uk, Thus, http://mediacentre.thus.net/company-information/, and Voxbone, www.voxbone.com.
See infra, notes 34-39 and the accompanying text.
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can probably balance the weight of the incumbent better than only small new companies, and
thus contribute to competition. But the designers of the system and its regulators need to be
aware that this is a battle of giants, and design the system to prevent abuses from either side.
This Article demonstrates that this concern is not only theoretical, by telling the story of
how French operators attempted to avoid their universal service obligations through European
and then French litigation. In 2001, the European Court of Justice ("ECJ") found the French
system of funding universal service in telecommunications to be in violation of EU law.9
Subsequent funding decisions were repeatedly attacked by operators in the French administrative
courts, especially the Conseil d'Etat, for a number of reasons.
The decision and its aftermath can be seen-as the ECJ clearly saw it-as another
attempt by France to put obstacles in the path of new entrants. Under this view, France does not
share the ideology of free competition and unregulated markets and is anxious to protect its
national champion, France T616com, from competition through all means fair or foul. However,
the battle around funding universal service can also be seen in another light-as a carefully
thought out attack by sophisticated competitors on a regulatory scheme protecting a value they
had no wish to pay for, universal service. A similar strategy-litigating to fight regulation-was
adopted in the United States by industry actors unhappy with regulation aimed at them or
burdens put on them.' 0 This paper suggests that that approach better fits existing data, and will be
useful for understanding the behavior of the operators after the ECJ decision, when they brought
repeated cases against universal service decisions by the French regulator.
Three general lessons emerge from this different reading of the battle around French
Universal Service Funding. First, it supports the warning mentioned above, that the incumbent
may not be the only actor with an incentive to combat or subvert the post-liberalization
regulatory framework, and that regulators and courts should be wary of abuses of the system by
new entrants too. Second, there is a real tension between the need to provide private actors a
forum in which to defend themselves against excessive regulation and to protect their rights and
the need to prevent use of the court system to cause delays and torpedo regulation. Ways to
resolve that tension need to be considered. Finally, France's universal service experience
emphasizes the importance of designing regulatory systems to prevent potential problems (or
create procedural safeguards in the right places)-an issue considered in other contexts. In this
9 Case C-146/00, Commission v. France, 2001 E.C.R. 1-9767.
10 In the Telecommunications context, see Rebecca Beynon, The FCC's Implementation of the 1996 Act: Agency
Litigation Strategies and Delay, 53 FED. COMM. L.J. 27, 28 (2000). Though Beynon attributes much of the blame for
the litigation to the commission. Id. at 29.; John M. de Figueiredo, Litigating Regulation: Corporate Strategy in
Telecommunications 1-2 (2000) (copy available with author) available at
http://web.mit.edujdefig/www/papers/litigation regulation.pdf (last visited April 22, 2010); Terrence P. McGarty,
Current Telecommunications Legal Issues, Litigation v. Legislation: Is the 1996 Act a Beginning or an End? (MIT
ITC working paper, 2002) (copy available with author) available at:
http://www.telmarc.com/2002 10 25%20Current%20Legal.pdf (last visited April 22, 2010); but see (noting that the
danger is from the regulators and judicial review is necessary). On the negative role of courts in making it harder to
regulate, see Thomas 0. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response to Professor
Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525, 539-56 (1997).
1 Dara K. Cohen et al., Crisis Bureaucracy: Homeland Security and the Political Design of Legal Mandates, 59
STAN. L. REV. 673, 712-13, 745-46 (2006) (noting why agencies are not always designed for success); Robert F.
Durant, Agency Evolution, New Institutionalism, and 'Hybrid' Policy Domains: Lessons from the 'Greening' of the
U.S. Military, 34 POL'Y STUD. J. 469, 469-71 (2006); DAVID E. LEWIS, PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF AGENCY
DESIGN: POLITICAL INSULATION IN THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY, 1946-1997 6-7 (2003); Terry
M. Moe, The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure, in CAN THE GOVERNMENT GOVERN, 267, 268-69 (John Chubb &
Paul Peterson eds., 1989); B. Dan Wood & John Bohte, Political Transaction Costs and the Politics of
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specific context, the French experience casts doubts on the desirability of using an operator-
supported fund to finance public service operators may not value. Operators are more apt to act
strategically to block a large annual assessment than they are to object to the addition of a small
monthly charge to customers' bills.
Part I of this Article describes the French market post liberalization, and the framework
put in place by France to fund universal service. Part II describes the version of the story
reflected in the ECJ decision. Part III suggests the alternative version and describes the data
supporting it. Part IV discusses the implications of the story. This Article then concludes with
some general observations.
I. FUNDING UNIVERSAL SERVICE IN FRANCE
A. THE FRAMEWORK FOR FUNDING UNIVERSAL SERVICE
European Union law requires all member states to open their telecommunications market
to competition as of 1998. From then on, the invisible hand of the market should rule the sector,
rather than the former state monopolies. 12 However, alongside the impetus for reform, concerns
were raised about the effect such reform might have on values important to the people of the
member states, such as universal service.' 3 Universal service in this context refers to providing
access to telecommunications in ways a "pure" free market would not.14
Important literature addresses whether there should be a right to basic services like
telecommunications and electricity.15 However, in relation to telecommunications in Europe in
general and France in particular, the question is fairly well settled by law, and the argument is
about implementation. Article 16 EC of the Treaty of Amsterdam said that:
[G]iven the place occupied by services of general economic interest in the shared values
of the Union as well as their role in promoting social and territorial cohesion, the
Community and the Member States, each within their respective powers and within the
Administrative Design, 66 J. OF POL. 176, 178-82 (2004); AMY ZEGART, FLAWED BY DESIGN: THE EVOLUTION OF
THE CIA, JCS, ANDNSC 49-52 (1999).
12 PIERRE LAROUCHE, COMPETITION LAW AND REGULATION IN EUROPEAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 35 (2000).
13 Damien Geradin, The Opening of State Monopolies to Competition: Main Issues of the Liberalization Process, in
THE LIBERALIZATION OF STATE MONOPOLIES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND BEYOND, 181, 181-183 (Damien
Geradin ed., 1999); JOHANNES M. BAUER, Regulation and state ownership: conflicts and complementarities in eu
telecommunications, 76 ANNALS OF PUB. AND COOPERATIVE EcON. 151, (2005); Pierre Larouche,
Telecommunications, in THE LIBERALIZATION OF STATE MONOPOLIES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND BEYOND, 15
(Damien Geradin ed., 2000); Wolf Sauter, Universal Service Obligations and the Emergence of Citizens' Rights in
European Telecommunications Liberalization, in PUBLIC SERVICES AND CITIZENSHIP IN EUROPEAN LAW: PUBLIC
AND LABOUR LAW PERSPECTIVES, 117, 134-36 (Mark Freedland & Silvana Sciarra eds., 1998).
14 Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, Agency Accountability Strategies After Liberalization: Universal Service in the United
Kingdom, France, and Sweden, 31 L. & POL'Y 111, 118-119 (2009).
1 See Sauter, supra note 13, at 120-21; Elie Cohen & Claude Henry, Sur les Bases et l'Evolution Ricente des
Services Publics Industriels et Commerciaux en France et dans l'Union Europdenne, in SERVICE PUBLIC, SECTEUR
PUBLIC, 9, 9-1 0(Conseil d'Analyse 6conomique ed., 1997); Mark Freedland, Law, Public Services, and Citizenship -
New Domains, New Regimes?, in PUBLIC SERVICES AND CITIZENSHIP IN EUROPEAN LAW, (Mark Freedland &
Silvana Sciarra eds.,1998); Elisenda Malaret Garcia, Public Service, Public Services, Public Functions, and
Guarantees of the Rights of Citizens: Unchanging Needs in a Changed Context, in PUBLIC SERVICES AND
CITIZENSHIP IN EUROPEAN LAW, 57, 58-59 (Mark Freedland & Silvana Sciarra eds., 1998); Adrienne Heritier,
Market integration and social cohesion: the politics of public services in European regulation, 8 J. EUR. PUB. POL'Y
825 (2001).
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scope of application of this Treaty, shall take care that such services operate on the basis
of principles and conditions which enable them to fulfill their missions.16
In the telecommunications context the European Union has officially decreed that access
(though not free access) to telecommunications is an important and basic right. The Universal
Service Directive states that liberalization goes hand in hand with securing the delivery of
universal service.17 Section 14 then goes on to say: "The importance of access to and use of the
public telephone network at a fixed location is such that it should be available to anyone
reasonably requesting it." 18
The details, however, are left to the member states, and can vary substantially.19
Similarly, the decision whether to compensate the operators providing universal service for their
costs has been left to the member states-within certain constraints aimed at assuring that the
funding mechanism will not give the incumbent an unfair advantage. A number of European
states have chosen to potentially compensate their universal service providers ("USO") and
therefore evaluate USO costs. However, once the ratio between cost and compensation has been
evaluated, only two countries, France and Italy, use a direct fund.
France was especially concerned about the effect of the liberalization process on public
service. Public service is an important value in France. 20 In addition, the previous economic
tradition in France emphasized other values besides competition and free markets, including
large national champions which were held in high regard, and which served the nation,
sometimes even when that was contrary to their narrow economic interests. 21
Under these circumstances, it was easy for France to adopt a universal service program
including geographic balancing and relatively generous provisions for vulnerable customers. 22it
also seemed obvious to members of the French government that fairness required compensating
France T616com for the burden placed on it by its universal service obligations.23 Since universal
16 Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European
Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 2 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1, 37 I.L.M. 56. For a more detailed
description of the development of Universal Service in EU law and especially in relation to network services, see
Stephane Rodrigues, La r6gulation communautaire des services publics de r6seaux, vers une thdorie g6n6rale de la
concurrence r6gul6e?, 44 Flux 80, (2001).
Council Directive 2002/22, 2009 O.J. (L 108) 51.
1' Directive 2002/22, supra note 17, at 53.
19 Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, Regulatory Accountability: Telecommunications and Electricity in the United Kingdom,
France and Sweden (Feb. 2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley) (on file with
author).
20 Schmidt, supra note 6, at 906; Cohen & Henry, supra note 15, p. 12; DENOIX DE SAINT MARC, LE SERVICE
PUBLIC: RAPPORT AU PREMIER MINISTRE 17 (1997); Tony Prosser, Public Service Law: Privatization's Unexpected
Offspring, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 75-76 (2000); Elodie Renaudin, L'6volution du Service Universel dans
le Secteur des T616communications (2004) (unpublished DEA Droit Public des Affaires dissertation, Universite
Paris x Nanterre) (on file with author), available at http://droitfil.free.fr/MemSU.PDF.
21 COHEN & HENRY, supra note 15, p. 51; Barry Owen, France, in COMPARATIVE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 45 (J.A.
Chandler ed., 2000); Nicolas Charbit, Country Report: France, in THE LIBERALIZATION OF ELECTRICITY AND
NATURAL GAS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 123 (Damien Geradin ed., 2001); JABKO & EISING, supra note 5; See MARK
THATCHER, THE POLITICS OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS: NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, CONVERGENCE, AND CHANGE IN
BRITAIN AND FRANCE 159-60 (2000) (noting the case of France T616com, transferring parts of its revenue to the
national treasury rather than reinvesting it in its own network). Similarly, in an interview with a member of the
French Electricity Company, EDF, a member mentioned that in spite of the costs of universal service going up, the
ministry did not want electricity tariffs to rise and forced EDF to keep the prices artificially low, against their
business interest. Interview with EDF official, in Paris, Fr. (Jan. 11, 2005).
22 Reiss, supra note 145, 125-126.
23 Interview with member of the French Telecommunications Agency, ART, in Paris, Fr. (Dec. 9, 2004).
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service is an important public value, and the state wishes to provide it for the community, the
cost should be shared among all users.
Accordingly, sections R. 20-31 to R. 20-34 of the Posts and Telecommunications Code
established a funding mechanism for universal service.24 Here France made its first crucial policy
choice. Rather than fund universal service through adding a set amount to customers'
telecommunications bills (as it did in electricity, for example),25 or through adding a
supplementary interconnection charge (as was done in telecommunications in Belgium), 26 the
government created a universal service fund, to which all operators were required to contribute
(later passing the costs on to their customers). This raised complex implementation issues. The
most basic task entrusted to the regulator, Autorit6 de R6gulation des T616communications
("ART"), 27 was to calculate what universal service cost-not an easy calculation. However,
beyond the problem of calculating the cost, important questions about distributing the burden
remain. Which operators will contribute? How will their share be calculated? There are several
ways to do this, and any choice would be controversial, since there will inevitably be winners
and losers.
Under the European directive, Universal Service costs are determined by calculating the
costs of providing it minus the costs that the operator would incur anyway, i.e., comparing the
costs to the operator in a situation where they have to provide universal service with a
hypothetical situation in which they would not have to provide it. However, that still leaves a lot
to be determined. The costs assessed for universal service in France can be grouped under five
headings:
1. Rebalancing France T616com's tariffs until 2000, as a temporary measure.
2. The costs of geographic balancing-i.e., assuring that all customers, regardless
of where they live, pay the same maximum price for fixed access and fixed voice
telecommunications service, so that rural customers and customers living in
remote locations (where the costs of providing services are higher) will not pay
substantially higher sums than those in urban areas.
3. Social tariffs-special low tariffs for "vulnerable customers," who cannot
afford full price.
4. The costs of providing public payphones even where it is not profitable.
5. The costs of publishing an annual free paper directory and running a vocal
directory service at a reasonable price.
While the calculation of the costs for items 2 through 5 was done in a fairly
straightforward (although quite lengthy) way using measured data, for item I France used a very
complicated formula which required both estimated and measured data. France T616com
collected the measurable data with some accuracy, but the basis for the estimation was
24 Loi 97-475 du 13 mai 1997 Code des Postes et Communications Electroniques [Law 97-475 May 13, 1997 Posts
and Telecommunications Code], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF
FRANCE], May 14, 1997, Art. R20-31 - R20-34.
25 Interview with former member of the French Energy Regulation Commission, CRE, in Fr. (Jan. 21, 2005).
26 Interview with member of the French Telecommunications Agency, ART, in Paris, Fr. (Dec. 9, 2004).
27 The regulator of telecommunications in France used to be 1' Autorit6 de r6gulation des t6l6communications,
known as the ART; however, following the regulatory package of 2003 the agency became the Autorit6 de
r6gulation des communications electroniques et des postes, known as ARCEP. I am referring generally to ART since
at the time of the events surrounding the EU decision, it was the ART, and I think that consistency in using the name
will prevent confusion.
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challenged successfully by the European Commission before the ECJ.28 The calculation of all
five components is complex, lengthy, and requires masses of data, supplied annually by the
universal service supplier, France T616com (most of the data is subject to audits annually
conducted by the regulator, ART). The entire process is work intensive and requires a high level
of expertise.
France initially decided to include all licensed operators, including mobile operators, but
not Internet Service Providers ("ISP"), as contributors. The requirement that mobile operators
share in paying for the costs for only 1997 was struck down by the [CJ's decision, but those
operators were not absolved from contributing to the costs of universal service in subsequent
years. France calculated the burden on each operator according to the volume (in terms of
minutes) of network usage; it later decided to charge each operator by revenue, seeing revenue as
a more equitable measure. France T616com was also a contributor, and in fact paid the major
share (under both systems).
In addition, during the first few years France used several transitional arrangements. For
example, instead of calculating some of the components of the formula for the first two years,
where the numbers were not being collected yet, it used flat rate estimates based on numbers
used by other European countries.
B. WHO IS REQUIRED TO PAY UNIVERSAL SERVICE? 29
As explained above, the costs of universal service are mostly spread between France's
fixed and mobile operators. Who are these operators?
The main provider of universal service is the French incumbent, France T616com,
currently only partly owned by government (45.3%), but strongly influenced by it in more than
one way. The head of the firm was usually a figure with substantial political connections (a
former president of France T616com, Thierry Breton, had then become the Minister for industrial
affairs and is known to be a friend of Rafarrin, the former Prime Minister, 30 and his successors -
both the chairman of the board and the CEO - are also well connected). 31 In addition, many
agency members have worked, for France T616com, as have many members of other companies
28 The rebalancing tariff, the first component, is calculated using the following formula: C = 12 x (Pe - P) x N where
Pe is the estimated monthly subscription charge after rebalancing; P is the actual subscription charge at the time and
N is the number of customers without special contracts. This information is taken from the ECJ decision. Case C-
146/00, Commission v. France, 2001 E.C.R. 1-9767 [hereinafter Case C-146/00].
29 This discussion is largely based on the data collected for my dissertation, Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, Regulatory
Accountability: Telecommunications and Electricity in the United Kingdom, France and Sweden (Feb. 2008)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley) (on file with author).
30 In the words of one Frenchman in an informal conversation, 'ils se tutoient', or they address each other using the
familiar 'tu' address.
31 Didier Lombard, Chairman of Strategy Committee, FRANCE TELECOM,
http://www.orange.com/en EN/group/governance/board-directors/index.jsp (last visited Mar. 25, 2010). From the
biography of Didier Lombard, appointed CEO and then chairman of the board of directors of France T616com after
Breton: From 1988 to 1990, he was the Scientific and Technical Director at the Ministry of Research and
Technology. From 1991 to 1998, he was General Manager of Industrial Strategy at the Ministry in charge of
Economy, Finance and Industry. He is Officier de la L6gion d'honneur and Commandeur dans l'Ordre National du
M6rite. Id; Stephane Richard, Chief Executive Off icer, FRANCE TELECOM,
http://www.orange.com/enEN/group/management/members/StephaneRichard.jsp (last visited Mar. 25, 2010). In
February 2010, Stephane Richard was appointed as CEO; he graduated from the prestigious Ecole Nationale
d'Admnistration, served in many high positions in industry and in many high level public service posts, including
Chief of Staff for the French Minister for the Economy, Industry and Employment (2007-2009). Id
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or of other actors who work in the telecommunications field. However, France T616com did not
just receive funding for universal service, it also paid into the fund, both as "France T616com"
and for its mobile operator, Orange, and since it was - by any criteria - still the largest operator,
it paid the largest share. A member of France T616com described this as "we take the money out
of our right pocket to pay into our left pocket." 32
In addition to France T616com, France had three substantial mobile operators: Orange,
which is a part of the France T616com group, SFR (Socit6 Frangaise De Radiot6l6phone) and
Bouygues T616coms.
In 2008, SFR merged with the fixed operator Neuf Cegetel, and therefore at that point
also owned a fixed network:
"With 19.7 million mobile customers and 3.9 million high-speed Internet customers, the
new SFR - created from the merger between SFR and Neuf Cegetel* - is the leading
alternative mobile and fixed-line operator in Europe, offering solutions tailored to the
needs of individuals, companies and operators."
SFR is a large company with years of experience and substantial sophistication. It is also
owned by large companies. The Vivendi group mostly holds SFR.34 Vivendi is a large multi
national company, self-described as "a world leader in communications and entertainment."35
SFR is clearly not a small startup without business savvy or ability to defend itself.
The other mobile operator, Bouygues Telecoms, belongs to the Bouygues group, a
powerful economic conglomerate with subsidiaries in the construction area and communications
area in France and worldwide. 36 Once again, it is by no means a start up or a company without
business experience.
The fixed operators in France include, among others, Belgacom, Belgium's incumbent,
BT France - a subsidiary of the British incumbent - and other large firms. 37 There are, of course,
small startups as well, but many of the cases, as a glance at the list in Appendix II demonstrates,
were brought by large and sophisticated operators.
32 Interview with member of France T616com, in Paris, Fr. (Dec. 22, 2004).
3 SFR, VIVENDI, http://www.vivendi.com/vivendi/SFR,952 (this was the text there when last visited Mar. 10, 2010;
it has since been changed and now reads: ": SFR is a 56% subsidiary of Vivendi. With more than 20 million mobile
customers, 4.6 million broadband Internet customers and 6,248 million euro in revenues for the first half of 2010,
SFR is Europe's leading alternative operator and France's leading alternative telecommunications operator. SFR is
an integrated operator, owner of its mobile and fixed-line infrastructures, able to respond effectively to the needs of
all customers - the general public, professionals, businesses and other operators.". This change supports rather than
undermines the point made - that SFR is not a small start up but rather a part of a large and experienced company).
34 This information is taken from Vodafone's own site, where it lists its holding in other telecommunications
company. Available at:
http://www.vodafone.com/start/investor relations/structure and management/subsidiaries.html, (last visited Mar.
10, 2010).
3 Press Release, Vivendi, Vivendi to Emphasize its Position as a World Leader in Communications and
Entertainment with its New Advertising Campaign (Mar. 9, 2009), available at
http://www.vivendi.com/vivendi/IMG/pdf/PRO90309 CAMPAGNEPUBLICITAIRE.pdf.
36 Presentation of the Bouygues Group, BOUYGUES, http://bouygues.com/en/group/presentation/presentation-of-the-
bouygues-group/presentation-of-the-bouygues-group/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2010).
3 Les Opirateurs Tilicoms, ARCEP, http://www.arcep.fr/index.php?id=9320 (last visited Mar. 10, 2010).
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II. THE ECJ DECISION STORY-FRENCH RESISTANCE
To read the [CJ's decision and the very few relevant scholarly references to the
decision, 38 universal service is the story of French resistance to the European Union's desire to
create real competition in the market. France, when creating its system for funding universal
service, has in design and implementation skewed the funding system to benefit France T616com
at the expense of new operators. However, the European Commission refused to let France get
away with this. The most dramatic battle began in 2000, when, after repeated communications
with France did not lead to corrective action, the European Commission filed a complaint with
the ECJ against the French universal service funding system.
On December 6, 2001 the [CJ justified the commission's misgivings and ruled against
France,39 finding that its system for funding universal service violated the European directives.40
The findings can be grouped under four headings. First, inflating the costs of universal service,
thereby benefiting France T616com at the expense of new entrants. For example, [CJ criticized
France's inclusion of "red list" costs-the list of customers whose name will not appear in the
directory, non-listed customers-as part of the calculation. Conversely, France did not calculate
the "intangible benefits" that France T616com will receive from being the universal service
provider.41 France was also charged with "estimating up" in several cases-i.e., evaluating costs
beyond what was the rate in other countries. Second, the commission strongly criticized several
methodological "shortcuts" used by France to calculate the costs of the first years. France chose
not to calculate some of the components in its formula, instead using estimates based on the
practices in other countries as shortcuts. For example, it set the net cost of non-profitable
subscribers at one percent of total turnover; and the geographical component at three percent of
turnover. It also calculated the initial cost of a non-profitable household as if all households were
non-profitable, claiming it is unable to identify those that were profitable before the balancing of
the tariffs. The claim against the method was that the French calculations lacked transparency,
both because some of the components of the formula were estimated based on comparisons with
other countries without explanation of the specific numbers arrived at, and because French
government did not submit information it was required to provide under the law. Finally, the
Commission and France disagreed on the interpretation of several provisions of the directive. For
example, the commission - and the Court - interpreted the directive as requiring the tariffs, if not
completely rebalancing them by 2000, at least a detailed timetable. The French Government did
not interpret the directive to require such a timetable.
Finding against the French system, the [CJ, under this version of the story, bravely
forced the rogue state to correct its problematic practices. Indeed, ART's reevaluation after the
[CJ's decision showed substantial reductions in the assessed amount of costs of universal
service and the amount operators had to pay to the fund. The amount for 1998 went down from
'3 COLIN D. LONG, GLOBAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND PRACTICE (2004); Renaudin, supra note 20, at 36-37;
Michel Berne, Telecommunications Universal Service in France, 10 INFO 121, 125-26 (2008).
3 Case C-146/00.
40 Id. A detailed description of the claims and the ECJ decision is attached here as Appendix I.
41 Britain, for example, did consider their incumbent's - British Telecoms, now BT - in their analysis of universal
service costs. This led the British regulator, at the time, Oftel, the Office of Telecommunications, to conclude that
the benefits cancel out the costs and BT does not deserve to be reimbursed. Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, Regulatory
Accountability: Telecommunications and Electricity in the United Kingdom, France and Sweden (Feb. 2008)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley) (on file with author).
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4,374 million francs before the ECJ's decision to 1,806 million francs after it; the amounts for
1999 went down from 1,646 million francs before to 725 million francs after the decision.42
However, even with the ECi's brave interference, the French system was not completely
fixed, and constant vigilance was required. Luckily, the operators competing with France
T616com took the burden on themselves. Accordingly, when the French regulator continued to be
recalcitrant, the association of French operators-AFORST-filed another complaint with the
commission. 43 Similarly, operators brought several suits in the French courts against France,
demanding that the system be corrected.
This version of the story can be supported by other examples of tensions between the
commission and France over France's protection of national champions, and scholarship
showing the French tendency to strongly support such champions. 44 It can also be supported by
focusing on ideological differences in values between France and the commission. 45 Universal
service is important to the French. The commission, on the other hand, has been promoting and
supporting liberalization for years. It values open competition and the market. The definition of
universal service in the EU directive surrounds it with many caveats. The commission that
enforces it does not encourage it. The ECJ, as part of the EU institutions and as an institution
enforcing treaties that place great weight on open competition, may be more sympathetic to the
operators' view than to the French desire to assure generous compensation of the universal
service provider.46 However, this is not the only possible story.
III. AN ALTERNATIVE STORY: NEW ENTRANTS V. UNIVERSAL SERVICE FUNDING
A very different story can be told about the struggle around universal service funding.
While the two stories do not directly contradict each other, the second story suggests different
cautions, many of which figure prominently in the United States regulation of the sector.
Under the second story, when transposing the universal service system into domestic law,
the French government created a mechanism to properly fund universal service. That mechanism
will allow the level of services the French government wanted to secure and assure that France
T616com will not bear the costs of universal service on its own. If France T616com is to operate
42 This recalculation of the amount after the ECJ's decision is taken from: Autorit6 de r6gulation des
t616communications (2002) Decision 02-329, Avril 23 2002, "Proposant les ivaluations rectificatives du cout du
services universel et les contributions des operateurs pour les annies 1997 a 1999 etproposant une modification de
l 'valuation privisionnelle du cout du service universel et des contributions des operateurs pour l'annie 2002. Can
be found on the regulator's site, at: www.arcep.fr/.
43 Renaudin, supra note 20, at 36.
44 Frank S. Benyon DIRECT INVESTMENT, NATIONAL CHAMPIONS AND EU TREATY FREEDOMS: FROM MAASTRICHT
To LISBON 96 (2010); Ian Bartle, When Institutions No Longer Matter: Refrm of Telecommunications and Electricity
in Germany, France and Britain, 22 J. PUB. POL'Y 1, 7 ( 2002) Volker Schneider, Institutional Reform in
Telecommunications: The European Union in Transnational Policy Diffusion, in TRANSFORMING EUROPE:
EUROPEANIZATION AND DOMESTIC CHANGE 60, 77 (Maria Green Cowles et al. eds., 2001); Bartle, supra note 4 at 7;
Thomas Kiessling & Yves Blondeel, The EU Regulatory Framework in Telecommunications: A Critical Analysis,
22 TELECOMMS. POLY 571, 572-92 (1998); Sebastian Eyre & Nick Sitter, From PTT to NRA: Towards a New
Regulatory Regime?, in EUROPEAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS LIBERALISATION 39, 48-50 (KJELL A. ELIASSEN &
MARIT SJOVAAG eds., 1999). But for a different vision that sees Europe and national governments as cooperating in
liberalization. Thatcher, supra note 5.
45 NICOLAS JABKO, PLAYING THE MARKET: A POLITICAL STRATEGY FOR UNITING EUROPE, 1985-2005 160-63
(2006).
46 I am grateful to Frederic Carteron who, though his analysis was different than the one above (and one I hope he
publishes separately), raised the point of differing values.
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as any other firm competing in the market, forcing it to solely fund the non-profitable services
government thinks should be provided, it would be at a disadvantage compared to its
competitors. Rather, costs should be part of the cost of doing business in France and shared in a
way that puts all market players in the same situation. Accordingly, the mechanism requires
other operators to contribute to a universal service fund that will cover the costs. ART calculates
the costs according to criteria detailed by the legislature. The costs are apportioned among
operators according to an objective formula based on the advantages they get from the system.
While France T616com, the monopoly that receives the highest advantages, will bear the bulk of
the costs, other operators will bear a proportion of the costs according to their profits. France
designed the system according to its best understanding of what was allowed under European
Union law, although it did place a value on compensating France T616com for real costs it incurs
in providing what is, in effect, a social service.4 7
The competing operators are for-profit companies that do not share the French
government's commitment to universal service. Even if they may be sympathetic to universal
service in principle, they naturally want to minimize their share, or not pay it. Faced with large
annual bills for universal service, they have a strong incentive to mobilize and fight to undermine
the funding system. Initially, they took the fight to Europe. After the ECJ had its say finding
much to fault with the French system and the French regulator fixed the system accordingly, they
had to find a different way to avoid the costs. The telecommunications operators started
challenging every decision of the French regulator in the courts-whether or not such a
challenge had merit and realistic chances of success.
Accordingly, this view sees the ECJ decision in a different way. The source of the EU
action is, in this view, a result from the operators' objection to paying for universal service.
Specifically, it stemmed from complaints lodged by two associations of operators, I'Association
Frangaise des Op6rateurs Priv6s en T616communications ("I'AFOPT") and I'Association des
Op6rateurs de Services de T616communications ("I'AOST").48 Accordingly, the motivation of the
process is not in the commission's efforts to force France to tow the line, but in the operators'
unhappiness with having to pay.
This view also emphasizes another direct consequence of the ECJ decision. Aside from
lower universal service costs assessed against the operators, the decision added substantial costs
and upheavals to a system that was not easy to implement to start with. The ECJ decision sent
the Ministry and ART back to the drawing board, to redesign the funding mechanism according
to the ECJ's requirements and to redo the work done for the first years, 1997-1999 at the least. A
year and a half later, in April 2002, ART suggested modifications. 49 The modifications deviated
from ECJ's decision in a few details, where ART saw the ECJ's decision as being based on a
misunderstanding of the situation. For example, ART explains in its decision that while the ECJ
criticized ART for not including a detailed breakdown of the calculation of the element Pe5o in
its formula, ART believed that a detailed breakdown was actually included. However, for the
most part ART put in place substantial changes in the system, cooperating with the ECJ decision.
Following ART's work, on July 11, 2002 the minister enacted a regulation ("arrit")s setting the
47 Interview with member of the French Telecommunications Agency, ART, in Paris, Fr. (Dec. 9, 2004); Interview
with member of France T616com, the French telecommunications incumbent, in Paris, Fr. (Dec. 22, 2004).
48Autorit6 de r6gulation des t616communications, supra note 44.
49 Autorit6 de r6gulation des t616communications, supra note 44.
50 Which represents the standard monthly line rental charge of reference in the formula, i.e. the theoretical line rental
charge that would be achieved if complete rebalancing took place.
The French system, where the executive enjoys substantial powers to legislate as well as to create rules, has more
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sums for 1998-1999 as well as for 2002 according to ART's recommendation. Shortly after that,
ART sent out individual decisions setting each operator's contribution for 2002. Later on it also
sent out the individual decisions regarding 1998-1999.
At this point the operators started using the domestic courts to combat the requirement
that they share in paying the cost for universal service. In the years following the ECJ decision
many cases were brought against the regulator. Some had merit, but many were brought without
any attempt to appeal to the minister, ignoring a basic procedural requirement embedded in the
French Code of Administrative Justice.
The first case decided was brought by the company Tiscali, objecting to the assessment
of over three million Euros for its universal service contribution in 2002. Tiscali emphasized its
financial difficulties and the fact that the law was not yet changed in accordance with the ECJ's
decision.
The court made two important rulings.52 As a general matter it stated that funding
universal service was an important policy objective for which the minister was responsible. Since
the matter could be urgent, the minister had, in principle, the right to enact temporary decrees
setting amounts to be paid even before the law was changed in accordance with the ECJ
decision. However, the court ruled that such decisions must be made in a transparent way. The
arrt in this case was not published, nor were the operators notified about it before receiving their
apportionment-therefore it was void. While the court acknowledged that the operator had a case
in this instance, it made it clear that the operator's main contention, that no costs can be placed
on operators until a new decree53 is passed, was wrong. The Minister and ART can require
Operators to contribute to the universal service fund before the law is amended according to the
ECJ decision, as long as the process is transparent and the ruling observed.
The Tiscali case was the opening shot, followed by many other cases. In 2005 alone, the
Conseil d'Etat decided 15 cases regarding ART's decisions about universal service for the years
up to 2002. In an interview with a member of ART, he said that almost every decision of the
regulator was attacked in the courts.54 In 2002 - 2006, at least one operate, often more,
systematically attacked every decision setting the rules used to calculate the costs for the past
year and the final calculation and compensations balances for that year.
Out of the 15 cases decided in 2005, 10.5 of the complaints against ART's price
determinations were rejected by the court for not requiring "reclamation" from the minister - in
more familiar American parlance, for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. 56
than one kind of rule/regulation. An arret is a relatively low-level - i.e., specific, and subject to other types of
regulations - implementation decree.
52 CE Sect., June 18, 2003, Societe Tiscali Telecom Req. No. 250608, available through www.legifrance.com (last
visited April 29 2011).
53 A decree is a higher level general regulation.
54 Interview with member of the French Telecommunications Agency, ART, in Paris, Fr. (Dec. 9, 2004).
5 Id. A complete list of cases, with a (very) short description of each, is attached as Appendix II.
56 For several of these the complaint against the decree was acknowledged as justified under Tiscali, but the ART's
decision could not be addressed because the company in question did not address the minister beforehand.
Therefore, only part of the complaint was rejected for non-exhaustion. See, e.g., CE Sect., Apr. 1, 2005, Societe 9
Telecom Req No 250609 available through www.legifrance.com (last visited April 29 2011).; CE Sect., Apr. 1,
2005, S.A. Bouygues Telecom, Req. No. 250572, available through www.legifrance.com (last visited April 29
2011).; CE Sect., Dec. 5, 2005, S.A. Bouygues Telecom, Req. No. 257683 available through www.legifrance.com
(last visited April 29 2011). The principle that before taking an administrative agency to court an actor must exhaust
- make use of - the procedures to challenge the decision offered by the agency is a long standing one in American
administrative law. See, for example, Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 108-110, 120 S.Ct. 2080 2085-2087, 147 L.Ed.2d
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Article R. 772-2 of the Code of Administrative Justice states, in the relevant parts: "Les
requtes mentionndes au deuxibme alin6a de 'article pr6c6dent doivent tre pr6c6d6es d'une
r6clamation adressde d la personne morale qui a 6tabli la taxe. . . ."5 Which translates to: The
demands (requests) mentioned in the second paragraph of the previous article must be preceded
by an appeal (reclamation) to the actor esablishing the tax. 59
In other words, the law clearly requires an application to the minister against the
assessment made against the operator. In spite of this clear requirement, the cases were filed
without any attempt by the companies to address their concerns to the regulator or minister
beforehand. As described above, the companies are sophisticated large actors, including French
branches of other European incumbents, such as Teleitalia, the Italian incumbent, and
telecommunications companies which belong to large, sophisticated French business
conglomerates, such as Bouygues Telecoms and SFR. They are well acquainted with French law,
or at least, they can hire lawyers who are. It is unlikely the lawyers missed the non-exhaustion
requirement described above. The impression is that cases are being brought to the Conseil d'Etat
even if operators know the case will be rejected. The question is, why.
One explanation is that the operators, rightly or wrongly, expect the minister to
automatically side with the regulator, and do not want to waste time on a futile appeal. This may
be true, but they must know that not approaching the minister will harm their chances at appeal.
Another explanation is needed.
In a system where decisions need to be made every year and where the decisions require
a high level of expertise and intensive labor, recurring appeals can be very disruptive. The
Conseil d'Etat did not overrule any of the cases on substantive grounds; but it annulled several of
the decisions that were made before the passage of the 2003 decree on procedural grounds. It did
so in decisions that came down in 2005, after the decree was in place. That means the companies
could hope to delay the process and/or recoup some of the costs. The courts could be used to
delay and weaken the implementation of the universal service funding mechanism.
IV. DIscusSION
The first question is which version of the story is more convincing. The first story fits
views of the French economy as based on support of national champions and opposition to the
liberalization process. 60 It can fit with previous tensions between France and the European
Commission on liberalization, and it is supported by the dramatic decrease in costs of universal
service charged to the operators compared to the costs before the ECJ decision. However, the
second version seems more convincing.
80 (2000) At the state level see Project: State Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 571,
661-679 (1991).
CODE DE JUSTICE ADMINISTRATIVE art. 772-2. The second paragraph in the article has been omitted.
Demands related to taxes and other impositions that fall under the administrative jurisdiction. See id.
59 The translation is my own.
60 Elie Cohen & Claude Henry, Sur les Bases et l'Jvolution Ricente des Services Publics Industriels et
Commerciaux en France et dans l'Union Europdenne, in SERVICE PUBLIC, SECTEUR PUBLIC (Conseil d'Analyse
6conomique ed., 1997); Sebastian Eyre & Nick Sitter, From PTT to NRA: Towards a New Regulatory Regime?, in
EUROPEAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS LIBERALISATION 39 (KJELL A. ELIASSEN & MARIT SJOVAAG eds., 1999); Rainer
Eising & Nicolas Jabko, Moving Targets: National Interests and Electricity Liberalization in the European Union,
34 CoMp. POL. STUD. 742 (2001); Mark Thatcher, Winners and Losers in Europeanisation: Reforming the National
Regulation of Telecommunications, 27 W. EUR. POL. 284 (2004) [hereinafter Thatcher 2004].
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The realities of universal service are such that the benefits to France T616com from
increasing the funding are not very great. France T616com pays the largest share of universal
service costs. The legal framework allows other operators to provide certain parts of the
universal service too. In particular, companies can offer social tariffs-reduced tariffs to
individual groups-and be reimbursed for their loss from the universal service funds. For a time,
at least one company took advantage of that option. 61 Therefore, increasing universal service
funding is not a dramatic help for France T616com. The French government's interest in inflating
the costs of universal service to support the incumbent is not as great as it might appear at first
blush.62
But the more important evidence supporting the second story is the continuing and
recurrent appeals to the courts. The heavy use of the domestic courts after the [CJ decision-
especially bringing cases doomed to failure-suggests reluctance to pay the contribution,
whatever the amount. Even winning regularly, the need to constantly defend its behavior in court
adds to the agency's burden and may lead it to be very cautious in its decision-making. 63
Judicial review of administrative agencies seeks to prevent abuses and offer a counter to
agency professional biases.64 However, as acknowledged by scholars, judicial review carries its
own risks.65 One of those risks, though not the only one, is the ability of regulatees to use courts
to delay and undermine regulation they are unhappy with. The idea that courts can be used to
delay implementation of regulation is not new.66 However, dealing with the problem presents a
constant challenge, and few real solutions have been suggested. The problem is that the
companies involved have a legitimate interest to defend. The operators need a way to protect
their rights and prevent abuses by the regulators, as well as to solve disputes with them-and the
courts are an acknowledged mechanism to handle these kinds of issues. 67 In the French case
especially, companies had good reasons to worry about the regulator being subservient to France
T616com, since there were close ties between many members of the regulators and France
T616com-specifically, many members of the regulator were trained in the Ecole Nationale
61 The company Kertel provided social tariffs between 2000-2002. See Autorit6 de r6gulation des
t616communications (2000) Dicision 00-459, May 17 2000, relatif a la demande de la socitd Kertel de proposer
tarifs sociaux; Autorit6 de r6gulation des t616communications (2002) available at www.arcep.fr. (recommeding
that Kertel be allowed to provide social tarifs); Dicision 02-308, April 23 2002, relatif au retrait pour l'annie 2002
de la socidtd Kertel de la prestation de < tarifs sociaux > available at www.arcep.fr. (recommending that Ketrel be
allowed to stop providing social tarifs).
62 Though it is a help, and could make it harder for a new competitor to successfully compete if they do indeed pass
on their costs to the consumer through higher prices.
63 On negative consequences of heavy litigation on agency behavior see EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN,
GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS 101-118 (1982); ROBERT A. KAGAN &
LEE AXELRAD, REGULATORY ENCOUNTERS: MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND AMERICAN ADVERSARIAL
LEGALISM 389-400 (2000).
64 Martin Shapiro, Judicial Delegation Doctrines: the US, Britain, and France, 25 W. EUR. POL. 173 (2002).
66 Tom Burke, On the Rights Track: the Americans with Disabilities Act, in COMPARATIVE DISADVANTAGES?
SOCIAL REGULATIONS AND AMERICAN ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM 242, 244 (Pietro Nivola ed., 1997); CHRISTOPHER
F. EDLEY JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY 237-244 (1992); MARTIN
SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS?: JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION 128-134 (1988); ROBERT A.
KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 29-32 (2001).
6 Rebecca Beynon, The FCC's Implementation of the 1996 Act: Agency Litigation Strategies and Delay, 53 FED.
COMM. L.J. 27 (2000); Thomas 0. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response to
Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525 (1997); KAGAN, supra note 66 at 225; STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE
POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANGE 145-46 (1974).
67 MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 17-19 (1981).
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Sup6rieure des T616communications (now Telecom Paris Tech), previously funded by France
T616com, or worked for the company before being members of the regulator.68 Therefore, a
mechanism for defending their rights is justifiably important to these companies.
On the other hand, the companies also have good reasons not to accept the system of
funding universal service. From the point of view of the new entrants, avoiding costs they do not
have to bear is part of their 'job"-they are corporations judged by the amount of money they
make for their shareholders, and fighting to establish themselves in a new market. Even if they
agree with the idea of universal service in principle, there is no reason for them to want to pay
for it if they can avoid or minimize costs-a classic free rider situation. As sophisticated strategic
actors they know how to use to their advantage all the mechanisms in place, including the courts.
The problem, then, is how to balance the new entrants' legitimate interest in protecting their
rights while minimizing their ability to abuse the system.
One alternative is to use judicial review doctrines to balance those interests, especially in
the case of the Conseil d'Etat. The Conseillers d'Etat have been trained as civil servants and
specialize in handling administrative cases. Furthermore, some members of the Conseil fill
important roles in the public service.69 They can be trusted to understand the realities of
administration and create appropriate doctrines.
The problem with this solution is not the inability of the Conseil d'Etat to handle the
cases before it, but the way the court is used in this area. It is litigation itself, not how cases are
decided, that diverts resources to handling cases, and has the potential to cause delay and
uncertainty. 70
Another solution is to impose substantial costs. Access to the Conseil d'Etat is in fact
limited by the risk of the loser having to pay costs, including lawyers' fees.71 In some of the
cases below, though not in many, costs have already been awarded to the government; however,
those costs were clearly not enough to deter since they are not very high. One way to reduce
problematic lawsuits is for the Conseil d'Etat to use its powers to award higher levels of costs-
"punitive" costs-where appropriate. The concern is that such a power may deter suits that
should be brought-i.e., have too much of a chilling effect. The judges' expertise may justify
entrusting them with such power. On the other hand, since the Conseil d'Etat does have very
close ties to the administration, on the face of it, concerns may be raised about it using that
power to protect the government. However, the Conseil d'Etat enjoys a high level of respect and
is seen as independent, certainly not as being hand in glove with the government, 72 it can safely
use its powers to impose costs without much risk of provoking undue criticism. Yet another
possible way around the problem is to design the regulatory system to reduce incentives to use
the courts as a delay tactic.
The French experience can act as a deterrent to other countries-European or not-who
want to fund universal service. Since no sane regulator wants to spend substantial amounts of
time in the courts, and since in addition to the complexity of setting the initial contribution
68 Interview with member of France T616com, the French telecommunications incumbent, in Paris, Fr. (Dec. 22,
2004). That is not to say the regulator does work for France T616com's interests - but it could look that way.
69 L. NEVILLE BROWN & JOHN S. BELL, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 63 (5th ed. 1998); YVES ROBINEAU &
DIDIER TRUCHET, LE CONSEIL D'ETAT (1994).
70 KAGAN, supra note 66, vii, 13-14.
71 Generally true for many civil law countries. See UGO A. MATTEI, ET AL., SCHLESINGER'S COMPARATIVE LAW:
CASES, TEXTS, MATERIALS 691-92 (Foundation Press, 7th ed. 2009).
72 ROGER PERROT, INSTITUTIONS JUDICIAIRES 35 (11th ed. 2004); JEAN VINCENT ET AL., INSTITUTIONS JUDICIAIRES:
ORGANISATION, JURIDICTIONS, GENS DE JUSTICE 82-84 (5th ed. 1999).
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amounts the French system led to a very high level of litigation, others may hesitate to follow
their lead. In fact, no European country besides France and Italy adopted a direct funding
mechanism.73
France's difficulties with its universal funding mechanism support funding the universal
service through some means other than a special fund. One way would be a direct addition to
customers' bills-in which case the costs would be directly passed on to consumers, as is done
by the French electric utilities; transaction costs might be reduced in this case. Another is adding
additional charges through one of the other funding schemes, such as interconnection prices. A
fund, where the operators are directly charged large concentrated sums once a year, makes them
feel the loss much more. Since it is a direct cost and is strongly felt the operators are likely to
mobilize to fight it. As has been observed by scholars, a burden on a concrete, concentrated
group is much more likely to generate resistance than a burden on a diffused group. 74
CONCLUSION
It may be tempting to see the French experience as a case of an anti-market state trying to
impose costs on new entrants in favor of its former state monopoly. That it is not the only way in
which the struggle around the costs of universal service can be seen. Surprisingly-or
unsurprisingly-the French experience in these cases mirrors developments in the United States
where sophisticated companies use courts to limit regulation. However, the European
institutions, accustomed to viewing the French system as a "dirigist" institution willing to bend
and avoid the law to support its national champions, are not sensitive to the other side of the
equation, new entrants' struggle to avoid handling of cases like the one brought to the
commission.
In addition, in this case the opening of the market directly led to an increase in litigation,
mirroring Kagan's predictions for Europe.7 5 Litigation around universal service is now a fact of
life for ART. Both it and the government should consider how to minimize the problems it
creates while safeguarding the legitimate interests of the companies involved.
73 Though some of them provide some funding to universal service indirectly through their interconnection tariffs.
See Thomas Kiessling & Yves Blondeel, The EU Regulatory Framework in Telecommunications: A Critical
Analysis, 22 TELECOMMS. POL'Y 571 (1998).
74 See, e.g. JAMES Q. WILSON, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS 308-14 (1973); R. Kent Weaver, The Politics of Blame
Avoidance, 6 J. PUB. POL'Y 371, 373-74 (1986).
Robert A. Kagan, Should Europe Worry About Adversarial Legalism?, 17 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD., 165, 172-75
(1997).
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APPENDIX I: ECJ's DECISION-COMMISSION'S COMPLAINTS, FRANCE'S RESPONSES, AND THE
ECJ's CONCLUSIONS
First Complaint
Commission's claims France responses Decision
Requirement to contribute to Article 4c does not require not Since in 1997 France T616com
universal service in 1997 has charging for 1997. There is no had a monopoly on voice
no basis in community law express link between telephony there was no unfair
since FT was still a monopoly. abolishing the monopoly and burden if it had to bear the full
Costs can only be refunded if funding universal service. cost of the universal service
there is an unfair burden; that obligations.
is not the case with a
monopoly.
Second Complaint
Commission's claims France responses Decision
France did not rebalance its Disagree that there needs to be The law requires that
tariffs before 1/1/1998 and did a timetable-a final date is rebalancing must be achieved,
not send a detailed time line. It enough under the directive, and the subscription tariff
put in the law that the and they have that. must be equal to it-both
balancing will be complete based on costs. Undercutting
before 31/12/2000 but did not the balancing tariff is
send a detailed timetable. unjustified. Balancing was not
achieved, even if the
difference was small, and the
French Government should
submit the timeline.
Third Complaint: method of calculating next costs
Commission's claims France responses Decision
Profitable household Ok to provide services to Annex III to directive sets the
subscriptions were included: customers which can be description of costs which
profitable-if cost less than provided at a loss or condition may be included-only those
revenues. Need to determine beyond normal commercial directly from universal service
this selectively. In reality, all standard, not focusing on provision. Provider must not
subscribers in France were profitable/non profitable. be burdened but equally may
included as part of the not get financial benefit from
calculation. it. Only costs from non-
profitable activities are
relevant. The French




Commission's claims France responses Decision
Calculation not transparent: The 65 frank price stemmed Bench marking is generally ok
there is no objective criteria: from a comparison between to set prices, but must be done
Unclear how Pe was countries which lead to a carefully. The commission is
determined. Based on margin of 55-75. So, the value right that the range in the
practices in other countries, is sufficiently transparent. Champsaur report is very
but there is no real basis- Impossible before balancing to broad. So, more specifics are
first, in the countries of identify the subscribers served necessary, and only costs
reference the detailed billing in accordance with normal related to universal service can
of customers is part of the commercial standards. be included.
basic subscription and that's
optional for FT. This leads to
an artiIicial increase in Pe, and
Pe included costs from
maintaining the red list, which
P didanot.ccordancewithnor
Fourth complaint: usingflat rate rather than calculationfor certain components
Commission' s claims France responses Decision
Net cost for non-profitable The Champsaur report shows The directive requires a
subscribers artificially set at there was no reliable way to precise calculation of net cost,
one percent of turnover. This calculate costs in 1998, so and states how the costs are to
is higher than estimates in suggested a margin hat led to be calculated. It therefore does
other countries, and higher one percent. Unclear if it's not permit a flat-rate
than that used in France in possible to calculate 1997 calculation. The 1997-1998
1999-2000. costsbART does not have system is therefore flawed.
data. Only reliable method,
though imprecise. Little
significant for cost to
providers-their position was
minor in these years.
Geographical component was Three percent stemmed from
calculated as three percent of an international comparison
turnover. Unclear how amount a pragmatic approach. A
arrived at, although elements complex calculation would
are mentioned. only lead to a very marginal
change. 1999 methodology
can be used to 1997-98, but
it's really difficult. And
allowing the precedent of
choosing another methodology
will lead to uncertainty for
traders.
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Commission's claims France responses Decision
Hardship tariffs: calculations In 1999 a new system was
imprecise. Change of system introduced, with reduction for
does not fix the infringement. minimum wage earners and
disabled veterans. In special
cases the state assumed
specific debts.
Fifth Complaint: other components of universal service drawn to increase costs
Commission's claims France responses Decision
Calculation of net cost of non- Costs and proceeds of comfort French Government concedes
profitable zones: does not services only taken into it did not comply with
include proceeds from account since 1999; red list directive, commission rejects
inclusion in red list and cannot be separated from the their claim about the red list
comfort services. No intent to publication of an annual it's separate from the
remedy the pre 1999 situation. directory. It's not a separate directory.
Publication of directory cost components.
separate from red list.
In 1998 the calculation is As much as possible, an
based on traditional data, not account was taken of the
on best practice. commission's
recommendations relating to
the application of Annex is1.
Application of the
methodology of 1999 to 1998
is really hard.
No account of intangible Agreed cannot estimate it
benefits to FT. retroactively.
Sixth Complaint
Commission's claims France responses Decision
No reporting of the Agreed. Complaint founded.




APPENDIX 11: CASES BROUGHT BY COMPETITORS AGAINST THE ART'S UNIVERSAL SERVICE
DETERMINATIONS 76
Case Number, Party Bringing Legal Issue Parties' Request Court's Decision
Date Case
1. 250813, La Soci6t6 Delay of That ART's Grave doubt
November 8, Tiscali T616com payment decision about legality of
2002 according to requiring Tiscali the decision and
ART's decision. to pay in two grave damage
installments 3, from no
670,000 Euros suspension lead





2. 250608, June La Soci6t6 Can the minister Annulment of the Yes, minister
18 2003 Tiscali T616com temporarily set decree of the could create a
universal service minister setting temporary
contribution universal service system, but the
without a new for 2002 and mode of
system put in costs. evaluation of











76 In ascending order of date. All cases here were brought before the Conseil d'6tat.
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Case Number, Party Bringing Legal Issue Parties' Request Court's Decision
Date Case
3. 250643, April Soci&t Cegetel Objects to the 1. Decree already
1 2005, Conseil mode of declared invalid
D'Etat calculating the in Tiscali's case,
contribution and claim moot.
the mathematic





4. 250644, April Socit6 Frangaise Objects to the 1. Decree already
1 2005, Conseil De mode of declared invalid
D'Etat Radiot6l6phone calculating the in Tiscali's case,
(SFR) contribution and claim moot.
the mathematic





5. 250645, April Socit6 Objects to mode 1. Decree already
1 2005, Conseil R6unionnaise Du of calculating declared invalid
D'Etat Radiotelephone contribution and in Tiscali's case,









Case Number, Party Bringing Legal Issue Parties' Request Court's Decision
Date Case
6. 250609, April Soci6t6 9 Objects to the Annulling ART's Denied for non-
1 2005, Conseil Telecom mode of decision exhaustion-the
D'Etat calculating the informing the company did not
contribution. plaintiff of the address a first
sums it needs to complaint to




to rend it null
and void.
7. 250610, April Societe Objects to the Annulling ART's Denied for non-
1 2005, Conseil Belgacom mode of decision exhaustion.
D'Etat Telecom France calculating the informing the
contribution and plaintiff of the
the mathematic sums it needs to
approach. pay in 2002.
8. 250611, April Societe Kaptech Objects to the Annulling ART's Denied for non-
1 2005, Conseil mode of decision exhaustion.
D'Etat calculating the informing the
contribution and plaintiff of the
the mathematic sums it needs to
approach. pay in 2002.
9. 250612, April Soci6t6 Ventelo Objects to the Annulling ART's Denied for non-
1 2005, Conseil France mode of decision exhaustion.
D'Etat calculating the informing the
contribution and plaintiff of the
the mathematic sums it needs to
approach. pay in 2002.
10. 250614, Socit6 Louis Objects to the Annulling ART's Denied for non-
April 1 2005, Dreyfus mode of decision exhaustion.
Conseil D'Etat Communication calculating the informing the
contribution and plaintiff of the
the mathematic sums it needs to
approach. pay in 2002.
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Case Number, Party Bringing Legal Issue Parties' Request Court's Decision
Date Case
11. 250572, S.A. Bouygues Objects to the Annulling ART's Denied for non-
April 1 2005, Telecom mode of decision exhaustion.
Conseil D'Etat calculating the informing the
contribution and plaintiff of the
the mathematic sums it needs to
approach. pay in 2002.
12. 251239, Soci6t6 Frangaise Changing the Annulling the At the relevant
April 11 2005, De regulation of minister's decree date, the law was
Conseil d'Etat Radiot6l6phone financing the ("arret") and not corrected
(SFR), Soci6t6 universal service ART's according to ECJ
R6unionnaise Du to bring it into subsequent decision and
Radiot6l6phone, conformity with specific there was no
S.A. Bouygues EU law-current decisions about urgency to
Telecom, Soci6t6 modification the universal demand money
Cegetel insufficient, service that has been












13.252125, S.A. Bouygues Jurisdiction over That the Denied for non
April 11, 2005, Telecom demand to minister's jurisdiction-
Conseil D'Etat reimburse sums. decision, should be
refusing to brought to the
reimburse it for tribunal
its contributions administratif de






Case Number, Party Bringing Legal Issue Parties' Request Court's Decision
Date Case
14. 250516, May L'association Attacking the To force the Mooted because
30, 2005, Conseil Frangaise Des method of minister to repeal decree was
D'Etat Operateurs De calculation for the 1997 decree. already repealed
R6seaux Et not fitting into before decision.




15. 257683, Bouygues Attacking system To annul the The method
December 5, Telecom for not 2003 decree for takes those cost
2005 considering not considering into
immaterial these advantages. consideration in













16. 257747, L'association Attacking system To annul the System is ok
December 5, Frangaise Des for not 2003 decree for (addressing
2005 Operateurs De considering not considering substance).
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Case Number, Party Bringing Legal Issue Parties' Request Court's Decision
Date Case
17. 252659, S.A. Bouygues The legality of Annulling the 1. Decree
December 12, Telecom the minister decree and annulled-ECJ
2005 decreeing the ordering the overturned
costs of universal reimbursement system, new
service for 1998- of the company. system not yet in











18. 262646, Soci6t6 Frangaise Attacking the Annulment of a Denied for non-








19. 250656,28 L'association Attacking mode Annulling the Decree already
December 2005 Frangaise Des of calculation. decree setting annulled-part
Operateurs De sum for 2002 and by minister and
R6seaux Et retroactively for part by decision
Services De 1997-2000. in favor of
T616communicati Tiscali.
ons;
L'association
Frangaise Des
Operateurs De
R6seaux Et
Services De
T616communicati
ons
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